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Patterns of Interpretation: Speech, Action, and Dream
In daily life we understand one another in terms of a commonsense interpretive psychology, which is integrated with 
language, and through which we discern meaning and motive in one another's sounds and movements spontaneously and 
continually. This capacity seems to develop together with language from early childhood, and both appear to have been built 
up through evolution, and programmed, in Chomsky's phrase, to grow in the mind (or brain).
This interpretive understanding encompasses both language and motive, and so seems fundamental to our co-operative 
lives. Since most of what we know is registered and expressed in language, it also seems basic to our thought. But since this 
understanding is so natural to us we rarely seek to investigate it systematically, or try to see how it can have the cogency 
required by its fundamental role.
As is well known, Freud attempted to extend commonsense interpretive understanding, by applying it to dreams. This 
extension is frequently contested, particularly in the literature which seeks to contrast psychoanalysis with science; but it is 
rarely discussed in the context of the fundamental, natural, and apparently valid form of interpretive understanding from 
which it flows. So in what follows I try both to describe some of the sources of the cogency of everyday interpretive 
psychology, and to indicate how these relate to Freud's Interpretation of Dreams.
I
We can begin by considering our understanding of language in our own case, and the way this relates to our understanding 
of others. In doing this we invoke a familiar asymmetry, as between understanding our selves and understanding others. This 
is often put as a difference between the first-person perspective, which we occupy when we use the first-person pronoun 'I', 
and the third-person perspective, in which we regard others when we think of them as 'he' or 'she'; or again as the difference 
between the role we take as subject or agent of our own thoughts and actions, and the role as object which the things we 
think about or act on, including others, have for us.
A salient aspect of this difference is that when we ascribe thoughts or feelings to another, our judgement is characteristically 
mediated by perception of that person's behaviour, and usually serves in one way or another to explain this behaviour, that is, 
to make it intelligible to us. By contrast, when we ascribe such states to ourselves our judgements are not mediated in this 
way. We do not ordinarily say that we are in pain, or think or want something, on the basis of observing our own behaviour, 
or in order to make this behaviour intelligible to ourselves. Rather we simply take it that we feel pain, or think or want 
something, and can rightly say that this is so.
Thus in the case of our own minds we have, as we can say, a capacity for unmediated self ascription. This characteristically 
encompasses all the states of mind which we regard as conscious, and so is remarkably sure and wide-ranging. We do not 
ordinarily suppose, for example, that we might be mistaken in thinking that we are in pain, or disgusted, or that we want of 
think something. In a great range of cases we take it that we might go wrong in ascribing these states to others, but not to 
ourselves. And although there are exceptions to this -- including the kind of motives which are studied in psychoanalysis -- it 
applies to many more states of mind than we ordinarily ever explicitly describe. Our thoughts and feelings on many topics 
occur and pass so quickly, and are so dense and numerous, that we could not seriously envisage communicating all of them 
to others, even if we tried. Hence our self-ascriptions are not only unmediated, but have a unique first-person authority.
It is hard to overstate the importance of this asymmetry, and the first-person authority which goes with it; for these features 
partly define what we regard as consciousness, and are at the root of the epistemological tradition stemming from Descartes 
and including the British Empiricists and their followers. The mental events and states about which we have unmediated first-
person authority include both thoughts and perceptual experiences which represent the world. As these are states of mind, 
they have a certain independence from the worldly things and situations they represent; and this independence, together with 
our first-person authority about them, makes them seem uniquely certain and free from empirical doubt.
Thus when I think I see a tree, or another person, I may be wrong as to whether there actually is a tree or other person there 
to be seen, for my perceptual and cognitive states are thus far independent of what they represent. But I cannot likewise be 
wrong that I think I see such things, or that it seems to me that I see them; for this is within the sphere of my first-person 
authority. Hence self-knowledge of this kind has been taken by Descartes and those who have followed him as an 
indubitable basis upon which the rest of human knowledge could be built or reconstructed. On this view of knowledge each 
person, as we might say, thinks alone; each of us constitutes an isolated island of intellect, working his or her experience into 
a world-picture which is justifiable from within. So on this account the first-person perspective encompasses the foundations 
of our knowledge, not only about our own minds, but about the whole world.
Now among the things we know in this apparently immediate and authoritative way are the contents of our thoughts and the 
meanings of our sentences, and this is a particulary striking achievement. Each of us speaks and understands an idiolect, 
which we take to be that of a natural language which we share with others, such as English, French, or whatever. So we can 
each combine the words of our idiolect in accord with the rules of its syntax to form an indefinitely large number of sentences; 
and in understanding these sentences we know the conditions in which they are true. For example each speaker of an 
idiolect of English knows
The sentence 'Freud worked in Vienna' is true (in my idiolect) just if Freud worked in Vienna.
The sentence 'Wittgenstein lived in Vienna' is true (in my idiolect)just if Wittgenstein lived in Vienna.
The sentence 'The moon is blue' is true (in my idiolect) just if the moon is blue.
.
and so on.
Thus each of us knows an indefinitely large number of truths relating the sentences of his or her idiolect to objects and 
situations in the world via the notion of truth. We can schematize this by saying that a person who knows how to use the 
sentences of a language knows indefinitely many instances of the form (using 'T' for 'truth').
T: 'P' is true (in my idiolect) just if P
Where 'P' is a schematic letter which might be replaced by any appropriate sentence of the idiolect.
When we seek to understand others, we do so by characterizing their environments, minds, and actions in terms of our own 
idiolects, and in a particular way. In interpreting others we make use of a vocabulary of words like 'desires', 'believes', 'hopes', 
'fears', etc., each of which admits of complementation by a further sentence. So we speak of the desire, belief, hope, fear, 
etc., that P, where 'P' can be replaced by any sentence suitable for specifying the object, event, or situation towards which 
the motive is directed. In this we as it were re-cycle our sentences for describing the world, thereby creating new sentences 
for describing the mind. Our finite stock of basic psychological words thus becomes the basis for a potential infinity of 
ascriptions of desire, belief, hope, and so forth. This practice implements our conception of the mental as having intentionality, 
that is, a kind of causal and logical directedness upon the world; for any description of this that P kind perforce represents the 
mind as engaged with whatever aspect of the world the embedded sentence 'P' serves to describe. Since we can ascribe a 
desire that P corresponding to any describable situation which a person might desire, a belief that P corresponding to any 
describable situation a person might think obtains, and so forth, this mode of specification is extraordinarily flexible and 
precise.
The practice of describing motives in this way is central to psychological understanding. To see something of its working 
imagine that we watch someone reach out to get a drink, and assume (hypothesize) that she does this because she saw the 
drink, wanted it, and so reached for it. Then we might try to spell out what was involved in such explanation in the following 
way. Using 'A' to name our agent, and underlining sentences so as to indicate patterns among them, we have:
(1) There is a drink within A's reach.
(2) A sees that there is a drink within A's reach.
(3) A forms the belief that there is a drink within A's reach.
(4) A forms the belief that if she moves her hand in a certain way then she will get a drink.
(5) A desires that she get a drink.
(6) A desires that she move her hand in that way.
(7) A moves her hand in that way.
(8) A gets a drink.
Of course we have spelled out this sequence in a whay which is unnaturally full and explicit, but this makes it easier to see 
underlying patterns. Thus for example we would not ordinarily say that someone desires that she get a drink; but this brings 
out, as the idiomatic to get a drink does not, that the agent's desire is that she, herself, get a drink; and this in turn makes 
more explicit the connection between the desire in (5) and the belief in (4) with which it interacts, and between the same 
desire and the situation which fulfils it in (8)
We can bring these patterns out more clearly by replacing the sentences which articulate the various desires and beliefs in 
the sequence by schematic letters. Then, and taking some liberties with pronouns and tenses, we have:
(1) P [there is a drink within A's reach].
(2) A sees that P [that there is a drink within A's reach]
(3) A forms the belief that P [that there is a drink within A's reach].
(4) A forms the belief that if Q then R [that if she moves her hand in a certain way then she will get a drink]
(5) A desires that R [that she get a drink]
(6) A desires that Q [that she moves her hand in that way ]
(7) Q [A moves her hand in that way].
(8) R [A gets a drink].
Clearly this pattern could be discerned in the explanation of many different actions with a similar underlying structure; and 
such patterns can be applied predictively, and to actions as we watch them unfold. Thus we might have seen the agent 
above notice the drink, and guessed from the way she looked that she would want to get it. This, in effect, would constitute a 
hypothesis that the sequence described in (1) - (3) had already take place, and that described in (5) - (8) was about to occur.
The same sort of patterned explanation also applies to speech. Thus consider someone uttering 'The day is warm' because 
she wants to say that the day is warm. In this case we have:
A desires that P [that she say that the day is warm]
A believes that if Q then P [that if she utters 'The day is warm' she says that the day is warm]
A desires that Q [that she utters 'The day is warm.']
This, as we can see, involves the same pattern as (4) - (6) above, with the sentences in a different order.
The patterns in psychological ascription here marked by schematic letters have a notable feature. They are on the one hand 
causal, and on the other also correct, rational, or logical. Thus, speaking roughly, we can take what we describe by (1) as a 
cause of what we describe by (2), what we describe by (2) as cause of what we describe by (3), and so on through the 
sequence. For, as we know, the transition between (1) and (2) marks the place at which light reflected by objects described 
in (1) strikes the eyes of the agent described in (2), and causes the changes in the retina, optic nerve, visual areas of the 
brain, etc., involved in seeing; and perception as described in (2) is a cause of belief, as described in (3); and so on. But also 
the use of the same schematic letter in (1) - (3) indicates that the perception and belief described there are correct, and 
correctly formed. For in describing a perception that P as caused by a situation that P, we mark that the perception is 
veridical, that it accurately reflects the situation which it is a perception of; and in describing the resulting belief as a belief 
that P we mark that the belief is both true, as beliefs ought to be, and also caused by the situation which renders it true, and 
so well grounded. Likewise the pattern displayed in (4) - (6) describes a formation of desire in light of belief which is both 
causal and rational; and (5) - (8) describe intentional action which is successful, that is, which is not only caused by desire, 
but in which desire is satisfied. So these patterns, as we can say, are both causal and normative : they are patterns of causal 
functioning which are in one way or another correct or as they should be.
We are thus dealing with a number of patterns of interpretive/causal explanation, some of which we can briefly describe, 
write, and label as follows. These include:
(i) A pattern of well-founded belief
B: P -[causes]-> A bels that P (cf (1) and (3) above)
(ii) A pattern of practical reason (the rational formation of desire in light of belief)
PR: A des that P & A bels that if Q then P -[causes]-> A des that Q (cf (4) -(6) above)
(iii) A pattern of the satisfaction of desire:
D: A des that P -[causes]-> P (cf (5) and (8) above)
These patterns, which can be represented in deeper and more detailed ways than sketched here, can be discerned in 
intentional action of all kinds. They seem constitute a part of the underlying 'grammar', or logical and causal structure, of our 
natural and intuitive way of understanding one another. Bringing them out in this way enables us to see how our that P mode 
of description of motives makes use of hermeneutic connections -- connections in sentential description -- to mark 
motivational causal connections, that is, connections between motive and motive, or motive and world, such as are sketched 
in (1) - (8). In these cases, as we can say, relations of linguistic coherence , such as obtains among the sentences we are 
considering, systematically mark relations of causal coherence, as between motive and motive, motive and action, or motive 
and world generally.
This alloy of linguistic and causal coherence flows from the that P mode of description itself. When we describe a desire by a 
sentence 'P', we tacitly lay it down that the desire is to be regarded as satisfied in the circumstances in which 'P' is true; and 
these are the circumstances we understand the desire as functioning to bring about in successful action, as registered in D. 
Likewise when we describe a belief by a sentence 'P' we lay it down that the belief is true in the same conditions as the 
sentence; and these are the conditions which we take the belief as serving to reflect, as registered in B, or again as serving 
to bring into the satisfaction-conditions of desires, as registered in PR. In these cases our norms for the truth of sentences, 
as registered in T, become norms for the proper working of perception, belief, and descire, as schematized in B, PR, and D. 
Something similar holds for other motives and mental states which we describe in this way. This systematic re-use of world-
describing sentences in characterizing the objects of desire, hope, fear, etc., in effect fuses our conception of the truth of 
sentences with that of the causal role of motives, so yielding a natural system for the hermeneutic (or linguistic) discernment 
of motivational causal role.
Recognizing the way that we naturally use relations of linguistic coherence to map relations of causal coherence enables us 
to reduce dissonance between hermeneutic and causalist approaches to interpretation, or to the psychological explanation of 
behaviour generally. Schematically, hermeneutic approaches to these fields emphasize that understanding persons is a 
matter of finding relations of meaningful coherence or fit -- as between motive and motive, motive and action, and so forth --
while causalist approaches emphasize that such cohering factors can serve to explain thought or behaviour only insofar as 
they bear upon them causally. Each of these claims represents a genuine insight into the nature of interpretive understanding. 
Advocates of each, however, have tended to ignore the way in which we naturally register relations of causal coherence 
among motives in terms of linguistic or logical coherence, as we have been illustrating; hence both have tended to contrast
finding meaning or coherence with discerning causes.
This has led to dispute in which advocates of each approach reject the insight of the other. Causalists have tended to deny 
the explanatory relevance of hermeneutically detected relations of coherence or fit, while hermeneutic thinkers have tended 
to deny the causal role of reasons or the relevance of causality to explanation generally. What we see in the case of desire, 
belief, and the like above, however, is that commonsense interpretive thinking naturally registers causal connection (and 
causal coherence) by way of hermeneutic (sentential) coherence. Hence, and as we shall see in more detail shortly, the 
finding of appropriate relations of coherence, or connections in sentential content, can be a way of supporting causal 
hypotheses, and hence a way of finding causes. Thus we can see that both parties to causalist/hermeneutic disputation are 
mistaken in their negative claims against one another, while in their positive claims both are stressing something correct, 
which, as their dispute indicates, might otherwise be denied.(3)
II
Now to go further into both commonsense and psychoanalytic explanation we must observe that the working of desire, which 
we can take as the central motive which we invoke in explaining action, is more complex than we have so far indicated. This 
is because we take it that desire not only prompts (causes) action, but also ceases to operate in response to the perception 
that action has been successful. We take it that someone who wants a particular drink will, after drinking, realize that she has 
had the drink she wanted, and so cease to want it. (She might now want another drink, or even to drink that drink again, but 
these are different matters.) Let us describe this by saying that we normally expect that when an agent satisfies a desire (that
is, when A des that P -[causes]-> P), and in consequence believes that this is so (that is, when P -[causes]-> A bels that P), 
then this results in the pacification of the agent's desire (that is, that A's des that P is pacified.) So, abbreviating as above, we 
have
(iv) A fuller pattern of the role of desire in commonsense psychological explanation, including the pacification 
(ceasing of operation) of desire, produced by belief in its satisfaction.
D* A des that P -[causes]-> P -[causes]-> A bel that P -[causes]-> A's des that P is pacified.
This pattern D* represents, as it were, the life-cycle of a single desire in successful intentional action. (It clearly contains 
within itself both D (the pattern of the satisfaction of desire) and B (the pattern of well-founded belief) above.) Thus in thinking 
that a person, A, is (intentionally) going to get a drink, we in effect frame a predictive hypothesis, which could be put into 
words by using the sentence 'A gets a drink' in all four positions in an instance of D*. We think, that is, that A desires that A 
get a drink, and we predict first that this will result in A moving her body in such a way that she gets a drink, secondly that 
she will come to believe that she has done so, and thirdly that this will pacify her desire, so that she turns to something else. 
(Of course, again, we do not formulate such predictions, or anything like D*, explicitly to ourselves. But that we make such 
predictions shows in the ways in which we would be surprised if the agent's action unfolded differently from the way we 
expect.)(4)
As this example suggests, our tacit explanatory and predictive use of patterns like B, PR, and D* is far more frequent and 
complex than we are aware. Indeed we commonly see intentional actions as informed by very many more desires and beliefs 
than we can perspicuously represent by listing the desires and beliefs as above. We can, however, begin to show some of 
the complexity involved by making use of another sort of diagram, of a kind familiar from linguistics. Thus for the explanation 
of the speech-act above, we have
In this we display the structure of our hypotheses about the constitutent structure of an 
agent's goals in action by a tree diagram, which grows from an aerial root down 
through a series of branching nodes. Such a tree will have an agent's overall goal in 
acting at the top (root), and will go down from this motive through the ordered series 
of other goals which the agent takes as requisite to securing the root. We can take 
each of these subordinate goals to give rise to a further tree of the same kind, until we 
reach goals which are simply the performing of various desired bodily movements in 
sequence, which we can label by M1, M2, etc.(5) 
In this way we can indicate the overall structure of actions or projects approaching 
everyday complexity, such as getting cash from a till. 
Each such tree relates the sentence at its root to a sequence of hypothesised effects, which, if all goes correctly, should also 
ultimately be describable as a bringing about of the situation, and thence of the belief, and thence of the pacification of the 
desire, described by that same root sentence. The same holds for each subsidiary sentence likewise, and in the order 
marked by the tree. The whole hypothesis thus fixes for each goal for each intentional movement by which that goal is 
executed a place in a determinate order of satisfaction and pacification. This imposes a complex bracketing or phrasing on 
behaviour, which segments the flow of movement upon which the hypotheses is directed into the series of units and 
sequences, groups and subgroups, which we perceive as the unfolding rhythm of intention in action. The whole, moreover, 
can be seen as consisting of iterations of simpler parts which correspond to each aspect of this segmentation, that is, to 
instances of D* governed by instances of PR. So we can see each goal-specifying sentence in a tree as applied repeatedly, 
now to articulate a motive as hypothesis, now to describe predicted (or cohering) effects of that motive as test, as in the 
simple case spelt out above. In such a tree, therefore, we find the basic normative and hypothetical structure of D* both 
repeatedly and in the large.
We can thus see our commonsense practice of intepretation as one in which we tacitly and intuitively hypothesize such tree-
like structures of motive as explaining both speech and action. Accordingly the patterns specified in such trees have an 
epistemic status worth noting. We interpret behaviour in accord with them naturally, and hence spontaneously, rapidly, and 
continually. In this sense we use them more frequently, and rely on them more deeply, than any generalizations of science. 
(But of course we have no need to realize that this is so.) We learn such patterns together with language, so that their use is 
in a sense a priori. Also, however, we find them instantiated, and hence supported in a way which is both empirical and a 
posteriori, in instances of successful interpretive understanding too dense and numerous to register. This indicates that our 
practice of interpretation can be considered to have the kind of strength possessed by a well-confirmed empirical theory, and 
this serves to explicate its potential cogency.
III
We have so far considered how in interpretation each of us systematically maps the sentences of his or her own idiolect on to 
the utterances and actions, and thence on to the mind, of the other. We can see that language also plays a central role in the 
first-person case. For when I consider, say, my own belief that Freud lived in Vienna, I use a sentence from my own idiolect 
(the sentence 'Freud lived in Vienna') to describe the circumstances in which which my belief is true; and something similar 
holds for the other sententially described states of mind which I ascribe to myself. So it seems that all my understanding of 
sententially described states of mind -- my understanding of my own mind, as well as that of others -- presupposes my grasp 
of my own idiolect.
This again is a consequence of our that P practice of describing motives. Since in this practice we use sentences to articulate 
the states of mind we ascribe to ourselves as well as to others, we can see that our grasp of the mind presupposes that of 
these sentences. But this, as the schematization in T makes clear, encompasses a potential infinity of beliefs, in accord with 
which each of us relates his or her sentences, and so his or her linguistically apprehanded thoughts, to the world. This is a 
massive claim to empirical knowledge, about which it seems we could in principle be wrong. So we can ask: how can we be 
sure that we use the sentences of our idiolects in a way which is coherent and correct? How can each of us know that the 
sentences in his or her idiolect -- and hence the desires, beliefs, thoughts, and feelings which we articulate by means of 
these sentences -- really relate to the world in the way we think they do?
This question applies to everything in the scope of our first-person authority. So once we ask this question, I think it is plain 
that there is a sense in which we cannot answer it.(6) When we occupy the first-person perspective -- when we think, 
speak, or act as subjects -- then we use our idiolects, either overtly or in thought; but we do not at the same 
time fully evaluate our uses for correctness, and it is clear that we could not do so without begging the question. If I am asked 
how I know that I hold the sentence 'Freud worked in Vienna' as true in my idiolect just if a certain person (Freud) performed 
a certain activity (worked) in a certain place (Vienna), there is nothing to the point which I can reply. For if I were mistaken 
about how my words relate to the world -- if unknown to myself I actually used 'Freud' to speak of Jung, and 'Vienna' to speak 
of Zurich, so that on my lips and in my mind the sentence 'Freud worked in Vienna' was true just if Jung worked in Zurich --
then I would not know what my thoughts were, and so would be unable to think reflectively at all. So this knowledge is in a 
sense the foundation of my articulate thinking, without which I would be lost; and that I have this knowledge is something I 
assume, but not something I can justify -- or even think about justifying -- without begging the question in the sense of 
assuming or presupposing that I have it.
This indicates, I think, both how our understanding of language is as at the basis of our cognitive lives, and also how we 
cannot justify this understanding from within the first-person perspective or by reference to first-person authority. But of 
course the fact that I cannot justify my own use of language from within does not show that this use is not correct. For when 
another understands my language and action, that other can see from outside my perspective that my language relates to 
the world as I take it to, and also that my first-person ascriptions of thought and feeling are correct. But then so far as another, 
who takes me as object, could thereby be justified in holding that my mind and language are as I take them to be, I am 
justified as subject as well. So even if the first-person perspective cannot be justified from within it can still be justified from 
without, and this justification is both interpretive and social.(7)
IV
We can now see more clearly how interpretive understanding is basic to our thought. Contrary to the Cartesian/Empiricist 
tradition mentioned at the outset, the first-person perspective itself stands in need of justification, and so cannot provide the 
foundations of knowledge. Interpretive thinking provides the required further justification. So our capacity to think and speak 
about ourselves is constituted as knowledge by a possible relation to others, which shows in our being such as to be 
interpretable by them.
This, however, provides a further challenge. How are to understand our interpretive practice as sufficiently powerful to justify 
our first-person authority about mind and meaning, which includes the precision and certainty with which we understand 
language itself? I think we can begin to see the outlines of the kind of justification which is required by attending to the 
contrasting role in interpreation of speech as opposed to non-verbal action.
Speech seems a kind of action which we can interpret with particular clarity and certainty; and it is through understanding 
speech that we attain precise and extensive understanding of the motives of others. But it is worth noting that speech is a 
kind of behaviour which we could not understand in isolation from the rest of the behavioural order of which it is a part. If we 
could not regard people's productions of sounds or marks as part of a larger pattern of action and relation to the environment, 
we could not interpret these sounds or marks, or regard them as language at all. (One can get a sense of this point imagining 
trying to interpret radio broadcasts of foreign speech, without, however, being able to know anything about what the 
programmes are about.)
By contrast, we can understand a lot of non-linguistic behaviour without relying on language, at least up to a point. We can 
generally see the purposive patterns in people's behaviour in terms of their performance of commonplace intentional actions, 
as in accord with the patterns above. But unless we can link such actions with language, we cannot, in many cases, know the 
precise contents of people's beliefs and desires; and in the absence of language it would be doubtful how far we could 
ascribe precisely conceptualized thoughts to people at all.
Interpretive understanding encompasses both words and deeds (verbal and non-verbal behaviour) But we now find that 
words with no relation to deeds are unintelligible, and deeds with no relation to words are inarticulate. It follows that the 
understanding of people we actually attain, in which we take their deeds to spring from motives with determinate and 
precisely conceptualized content, requires us to integrate our understanding of verbal and non-verbal action, and hence to 
correlate and co-ordinate the two. It is some such integration which enables us to tie the complex structure of utterance to 
particular points in the framework of action and context, and thereby to interpret language; and this in turn enables us to 
interpret the rest of behaviour as informed by experience and thought which, like that expressed in language, has fully 
articulate content.
I think that the particular mode of integration which we use involves what we can regard as a process of interpretive 
triangulation. This turns on the fact that in interpreting speech we do not merely assign meanings to sounds; rather we 
characteristically take utterances as expressions of desire, belief, intention, and other motives. (Thus we take regularly take 
assertions as expressing beliefs, questions as expressing desires to know something, requests or orders as expressing 
desires that something be done, and so forth.) This enables us to interpret the motives which we take to be expressed in this 
way with precision, and also to relate such interpretation to the speaker's ability to express such motives with first-person 
authority. Clearly, however, we could not take utterances as such expressions of motives with any degree of accuracy and 
certainty, unless we also had independent means of determining what the agent's operative desires, beliefs, or intentions 
really were. Evidently the means we use are the interpretation of further actions, including non-verbal ones.
In general, we are able to regard utterances as accurate or authoritative expressions of motives because doing so enables 
us to interpret other actions, and with cogency, as stemming from those same motives, or others related to them. In 
understanding persons in this way, therefore, we in effect correlate their utterances with their other actions, as effects of a set 
of common causes (motives). Schematically, insofar as we take an utterance of 'P' as an expression of a desire, intention, or 
belief that P, and then confirm this by independently interpreting further actions as flowing from that same motive, we thereby 
correlate utterance and action, as effects of that desire, intention, or belief. By this means we triangulate from episodes in 
speech and non-verbal action to focus upon their common causes, that is, motives which can be specified by relation to both 
verbal and non-verbal behaviour.
In this we constantly and tacitly cross-check the motives we assign via speech against those we assign via non-verbal action; 
and this method becomes particularly powerful where the interpretee also has first-person authority. Roughly, the more an 
interpretee can put his or her goals and beliefs into words -- the more the interpretee exhibits first-person authority -- the 
better an interpreter is able to use those words to understand both the interpretee's speech and other actions. But the better 
an interpreter is able to understand the interpretee's speech and other actions, the more fully the interpreter can check the 
interpretee's first-person authority. So in favourable circumstances an interpreter can cross-check his or her understanding of 
an interpretee's verbal action, non-verbal action, and first-person authority together, and in such a way as simultaneously to 
confirm all three.
We can see this in a kind of situation which is extremely common in everyday interpretive understanding. Suppose that I 
frame hypotheses as to the motives upon which you are presently acting, and also about what the sounds in your idiolect 
mean. Then suppose that you also make sounds which, according to my understanding of your idiolect, constitute 
authoritative expressions of the motives upon which I take you to act, and your further behaviour bears this out. Questions of 
sincerity aside, this tends to show both (i) that my hypotheses about both the meanings of your utterances and the motives 
for your present behaviour are correct, and (ii) that you have first-person authority about these things. (The principles 
underlying this kind of inference are discussed further in an Appendix to this paper.)
In such cross-checking of interpretive hyptheses everything is confirmed empirically, so that nothing is merely assumed or 
taken on trust. As I test my understanding of your non-verbal actions against my understanding of your expressions of motive 
my confidence in my interpretations is based upon their success in explaining and predicting what you do and say, and my 
confidence in your first-person authority is based upon its coinciding with my own independent understanding of the actions 
and utterances in which it is expressed. So the more instances of your verbal and non-verbal behaviour I understand in this 
way the greater confidence I can gain about my interpretations of your actions and utterances, and also your possession of 
first person authority.(2)
The same, of course, also holds for your understanding of me. So given the each of us is both a competent interpreter and 
an authoritative interpretee, it seems that by this method we may attain mutual understanding which is highly precise and 
certain. Of course an interpreter will not always interpret accurately, and there are circumstances in which an interpretee's 
first-person authority will fail. Still, an interpreter can correct faulty interpretations in light of evidence provided by an 
interpretee, can check how far the interpretee's first-person account is accurate, and can try to correct it where it is not. 
Interpreter and interpretee can thus together continually explore the assumptions and presuppositions of interpretation of this 
kind, in a process which admits of continual extension and refinement.
This particularly applies to the understanding of language. For each of us can in principle take any of our countless 
interpretations of another's non-verbal actions, and seek to pair it with an appropriate self-ascription from the other; and by 
this means each interpretation of non-verbal action, provided it is correct, can also be made to test and improve each's 
understanding of the other's use of language. This potentially infinite correlation between verbal and non-verbal action can 
thus be exploited indefinitely often, to drive confirmation of the hypothesis that each understands the language of the other 
steadily upwards. This process exploits first-person authority about language in such a way as to provide it with continuous 
testing and ratification, and so bridges the justificatory gap noted above. So by this means, it seems, we can come to regard 
our possession of mutual understanding, and in particular mutual linguistic understanding, as confirmed in the way our 
intellectual practice requires.
V
This sketch of our commonsense practice of interpretation is of course very incomplete, but it suggests that interpretation 
proceeds most surely where an interpreter can constantly match his or her own account of an interpretee's motives with the 
interpretee's own potentially authoritative expression of these motives in speech. These theoretically ideal conditions for 
interpretation are in fact actually approximated in the therapy devised by Freud, which provided the background for his 
interpretation of dreams. In this an interpretee (analysand) provides an interpreter (analyst) with the fullest possible verbal 
specification of the motives which both are seeking to understand. Also the analysand engages in free association, reporting 
the contents of consciousness as they occur, without seeking to censor them, or to render them logical or sensible. This 
enables the analyst to frame hypotheses (interpretations) as to further motives on the part of the analysand, which both can 
then consider on the basis of the maximum of shared relevant data.
Above we discussed the everyday practice of the explanation of action by reference to desires (goals) and beliefs. As is 
familiar, psychoanalysis extends this practice by relating dreams, symptoms, and other phenomena to desires or goals as 
well. The nature of this extension can partly be seen in very simple examples. Thus Freud found that when he had eaten 
anchovies or some other salty food, he was liable to have a dream that he was drinking cool delicious water. After having this 
dream, or a series of such dreams, Freud would awake, find himself thirsty, and get a drink. Probably many people have had 
this dream, or its counterpart concerning urination. And anyone who has such a dream will naturally regard it as a 
wishfulfilment in Freud's sense; that is, as (i) caused by, and (ii) representing the satisfaction of, the desire to drink felt on 
waking.
This natural reasoning is clearly cogent; and it turns upon the fact that the dreamer's desire is so clearly and closely related in 
sentential content to the dream. This is more or less obvious, but let us spell it out. The dreamer's desire is for a certain sort 
of situation (that in which the dreamer has a drink), and the dream represents that situation as real (the dreamer is having a 
drink). To put the point schematically, the dreamer's desire is that P, and the dream is that P, and this striking similarity gives 
good reason to suppose that the desire brought about the dream. Also it seems that such a dream has a pacifying influence -
- perhaps only a fleeting one -- on the desire which prompts it. The dream-experience of drinking seems to provide a form of 
temporary relief or check on the underlying thirst, the insufficiency of which is indicated by the dreamer's waking to get a real 
drink.
Such an account assimilates the dream to wishful thinking or imagining, and this, and its role in the pacification of desire, are 
also familiar. We are aware in many other cases that our response to a desire or wish that P is in one way or another to 
imagine, suppose, or make believe that P (or something related to P) is the case. We know that people day-dream in this 
way regularly, and often more or less deliberately; and such episodes of imagining may give pleasure, and seem partly to 
pacify the desires which they represent as fulfilled. The same applies to the kind of make-believe found in children's play, or 
again to the suspension of disbelief or imaginative immersion involved in the theatre, cinema, video games, and the like. In 
these and many other cases, it seems, people make use of forms of imaginative representation to pacify desires which they 
cannot or would not actually satisfy by representations of their satisfaction. In using imaginative representation in this way, 
moreover, people regularly falsify reality -- represent things as other than they are -- in two connected ways. They 
misrepresent the state of their own mind in representing themselves as experiencing the satisfaction of some desire which, in 
fact, remains frustrated. And they misrepresent the state of their own activity, in representing themselves as satisfying a 
particular desire, while in fact they are at best pacifying that desire with a false representation of its satisfaction. (The 
dreamer represents himself as actually drinking, while in fact he is only dreaming of doing so.)
Above we described intentional actions as sharing a common schematic pattern; and we can see that the episodes of wishful 
imagining we are now considering share a common pattern as well. In all these cases a desire (or wish) that P leads to a 
form of imagining or making-believe that P, which in one way or another serves (perhaps only partly or incompletely) to pacify 
the desire.(4) If we call the kind of belief- or experience-like representation involved in such cases 'b-representation', then we 
can write their common pattern as:
W: A des (wish) that P -[causes]->A b-reps that P -[causes]-> A's des (wish) that P is pacified.
This pattern is evidently closely related to D* above. Both are patterns in which desire is pacified, and via representation; for 
belief, as it figures in D* can be taken as the limiting case of belief-like representation which figures in W. The kinship shows 
in the fact that W can be regarded as a version of D* in which the role of reality is left out, so that an instance of W can be 
seen as a kind of short-circuiting of the full cycle described by D*. In the example of drinking by which we illustrated D* above, 
the agent's desire produced a real action resulting in a real drink, and thence in a pacifying belief that she was drinking. In a 
dream of drinking, by contrast, the mind (or brain) by-passes the path through reality which might result in real satisfaction, 
and produces the pacifying representation directly and by itself. (This shows in that fact that W is like D* except for the 
omission of '-[causes]-> P -[causes]->'; that is, except for the production of the real action which satisfies desire and renders 
the pacifying belief true and justified.)
Since we are already familiar with many ways in which people use forms of imaginative representation to pacify their desires, 
pattern W appears to be one which we already tacitly use and understand, even if we rarely make it explicit. And it is certainly 
intelligible that such a pattern should exist, and that it should be so closely related to that of action. For, as D* already makes 
clear, action is aimed not only at satisfaction, but also at the pacification of desire; and in successful action the mind (or brain) 
achieves this pacification by way of belief, that is, by way of representation. Since such representation is the key to 
pacification in the case of successful action, it is not surprising that a related form of representation -- familiar in various 
forms of imagination, make-believe, suspension of disbelief, and the like -- should also play a role in pacifying desire and 
motives related to it. Human desire far outruns the possibilities of successful action. So it is natural that desire should admit 
of pacification by other means, and that there should be forms of desire, or motives related to desire, which are 
characteristically pacified by representation alone.
To see something of the role of W in psychoanalytic interpretation let us consider the example with which Freud begins The 
Interpretation of Dreams, his own dream of Irma's injection. In this dream Freud met Irma, a family friend and patient, whom 
he had diagnosed as hysterical and treated by an early version of psychoanalysis. He told Irma that if she still felt pains, this 
was her own fault, for not accepting his 'solution' to her difficulties. As she continued to complain, however, he became 
alarmed that she was suffering from an organic illness which he had failed to diagnose, and this turned out to be so. Freud 
examined Irma, and then she was examined by some of Freud's colleagues, including his senior colleague M; and it became 
manifest not only that she was organically ill, but also that her illness was caused by a toxic injection given by another of 
Freud's colleagues, his family doctor Otto. Thus he sets out the parts of the dream with which we shall be concerned as 
follows:
....numerous guests, among them Irma. I at once took 
her on one side, as though to answer her letter and to 
reproach her for not having accepted my 'solution' yet. I 
said to her 'If you still get pains, it' really only your 
fault.' She replied: 'If you only knew what pains I've got 
now in my throat and stomach and abdomen --it's 
choking me' -- I was alarmed and looked at her....I 
thought to myself that after all I must be missing some 
organic trouble....I at once called in Dr. M.., and he 
repeated the examination and confirmed it...M. said 
'There's no doubt it's an infection, but no matter; 
dysentery will supervene and the toxin will be 
eliminated.'...We were directly aware, too, of the origin 
of the infection. Not long before, when she was feeling 
unwell, my friend Otto had given her an 
injection....Injections of that sort ought not to be made 
so thoughtlessly...And probably the syringe had not 
been clean. (IV 107)
Unlike the simple dream of drinking this dream does not appear to be wish-fulfilling: in fact it dealt with topics which were not 
pleasant to Freud. It concerned the continued suffering of a patient who was also a family friend, and for whom, therefore, the 
question of his responsibility was particularly acute; and also about the possibility that he had misdiagnosed an organic 
illness as hysteria, which he described as 'a constant anxiety' to someone offering psychological treatment. But Freud 
systematically collected his free associations -- the thoughts, feelings, etc., which occurred to him -- in connection with each 
element of the dream; and in light of these we can that the treatment of these topics in the dream is in fact wishful, and in a 
way which is radical.
The topics of the dream had arisen on the day before. Otto had just returned from visiting Irma and her family, and had briefly 
discussed Irma with Freud, commenting that she was looking 'better, but not yet well'. Freud had felt something like a reproof 
in this, as though he had held out too much hope that Irma might be cured; and in consequence he regarded the remark as 
thoughtless, and felt annoyed with Otto. (Also, as it happened, Otto had been called on to give someone an injection while at 
Irma's -- cf the topic of the dream -- and Freud had just had news indicating, as he thought, that another of his female 
patients had been given a careless injection by some other doctor, and had been contemplating his own careful practice in 
this respect with a degree of self-satisfaction.) That night, in order to justify himself, Freud had started to write up Irma's case 
to show to M, who was respected by both himself and Otto, and who appeared in the dream as diagnosing Irma's illness and 
becoming aware that it was Otto's fault.
In considering the dream Freud noted that his desire to justify himself in respect of Irma's case, and in particular not to be 
responsible for her suffering, was apparent from the beginning, in which he told Irma that her pains were now her own fault. 
Also, he felt that his alarm at her illness in the dream was not entirely genuine. So, as Freud realised, it seemed that he was 
actually wishing that Irma be organically ill: for as he undertook to treat only psychological complaints, this also would mean 
that he could not be held responsible for her condition, by Otto or anyone else. This theme, indeed, seemed carried further in 
the rest of the dream, in which M found that Otto, not Freud, bore responsibility for Irma's illness. The whole dream, in fact, 
could be seen as a wishful response to Otto's remark. According to the dream, and contrary to what Freud had taken Otto to 
imply, Freud bore no responsibility whatever for Irma's condition. Rather, Otto was the sole cause of her suffering, and this 
was a result of Otto's bad practice with injections, a matter about which Freud himself was particularly careful.
The contrasting role of desire in action and wishfulfilment shows here particularly clearly. Freud's intentional action in 
response to his desire to be cleared of culpable responsibility was to write up a case history to show to his respected senior 
colleague M., whose authoritative judgement might serve to clear him. This is an action in potential accord with pattern PR, 
and so also with D*. His dream apparently shows the same motive at work, but in a very different way. There the desire to be 
cleared produced no rational action, but rather gave rise directly to a (dreamt) belief-like representation of a situation in which 
Freud was cleared of responsibility in a whole variety of ways, some involving M. These are instances of b-representation 
produced in accord with pattern W.
We can think of the process by which we specify these instances, and thus represent the material of a dream in terms of 
pattern W, as follows. The dreamer's free associations, which range over intimate details of his or her life and thought, give 
information about incidents and emotions (Otto's giving someone an injection while at Irma's, his remark about Irma, Freud's 
annoyance, etc.) which appear to have influenced the content of the dream. These apparent connections between 
associations and dream are data which require to be explained. The explanation needed is one which specifies how the 
material from the associations is causally related to the content of the dream.
Inspection of Freud's dream and his associations reveals many such apparent connections. We might start in a preliminary 
way to list some we have considered as follows
Data from the Associations Data from the Dream
Freud wants not to be responsible for 
Irma's suffering.
Freud says to Irma 'If you still get 
pains, its really only your fault.'
Freud wants not to be responsible for 
Irma's suffering.
Irma is suffering from an organic 
complaint, for the treatment of which 
Freud is not responsible.
Freud is annoyed with Otto, for his 
remark implying that Freud was in 
some way at fault in his practice with 
Irma.
Otto is at fault in his practice with 
Irma.
Otto had given someone an injection 
while at Irma's, and Freud has been 
contemplating that his injections 
never cause infection.
Otto gave Irma an injection which 
caused an infection.
Freud desires to clear himself of 
responsibility for Irma's suffering.
Otto bears sole responsibility for 
Irma's suffering.
Freud was hoping that M's opinion of 
his treatment of Irma would clear him 
of responsibility.
M observes Otto's bad practice and 
recognises that Otto bears full 
responsibility for Irma's suffering.
Freud considered Otto's remark to 
him thoughtless.
Otto's injection of Irma was 
thoughtless.
This list is incomplete but illustrative. It seems hard to deny that the relation of elements on the left to those on the right 
requires explanation in terms of a causal connection. This being so, the question arises as to what kind of causal hypothesis 
would provide the best explanation. Freud's hypothesis is in effect that these data are linked by wishful imaginative 
representation, and hence in accord with pattern W. We can represent this hypothesis in relation to the data as follows.
Data from the associations Hypothesis: the data from the 
associations are linked with 
those from the dream by 
wishful imaginative 
representation.
Data from the dream.
Freud wants not to be 
responsible for Irma's 
suffering.
Freud wishfully represents 
Irma's suffering as not his 
fault, but her own.
Freud says to Irma 'If you still 
get pains, its really only your 
fault.
Freud wants not to be Freud wishfully represents Irma is suffering from an 
responsible for Irma's 
suffering.
Irma as suffering from 
something for which he is not 
responsible.
organic complaint, for the 
treatment of which Freud is 
not responsible.
Freud is annoyed with Otto, 
for his remark implying that 
Freud was in some way at 
fault in his practice with Irma.
Freud wishfully represents 
the situation as the reverse of 
that implied by Otto, so that it 
is Otto, not Freud himself, 
who can be accused of fault 
connected with Irma's 
suffering.
Otto is at fault in his practice 
with Irma.
Otto had given someone an 
injection while at Irma's, and 
Freud has been 
contemplating that his 
injections never cause 
infection.
Freud uses elements from 
reality to wishfully represent 
the situation as one in which 
Otto, not Freud himself, 
should be accused of fault 
connected with Irma's 
suffering.
Otto gave Irma an injection 
which caused an infection.
Freud desires to clear himself 
of responsibility for Irma's 
suffering.
Freud wishfully represents 
the situation as one in which 
he has no responsibility for 
Irma's suffering.
Otto bears sole responsibility 
for Irma's suffering.
Freud was hoping that M's 
opinion of his treatment of 
Irma would clear him of 
responsibility.
Freud wishfully represents M 
as finding that Irma's 
suffering was Otto's fault.
M observes Otto's bad 
practice and recognises that 
Otto bears full responsibility 
for Irma's suffering.
Freud considered Otto's 
remark to him thoughtless.
Freud wishfully represents 
Otto as thoughtless.
Otto's injection of Irma was 
thoughtless.
Now this table represents only a fraction of the data from the association and dream which bear on the hypotheses advanced 
in it; but examination of further data will also be found to fit with these. Freud's interpretation thus serves to explain data 
which are clearly discernible, by bringing them under an hypothesis whose pattern is represented by W. The application of 
this pattern, however, carries a commitment to a range of hitherto unacknowledged mental states and processes. The 
processes are those of the wishful imagining which give rise to the manifest content of dreams; and the states are those 
desire-like states which give rise to the wishful imagining, and which, therefore, we call wishes, but in a theoretical and 
extended sense. These here include Freud's wishing that Irma's suffering be her own fault, that it be organic, that it be Otto's 
rather than Freud's responsibility, and so forth. Thus in Freud's conception a dream-wish is an entity introduced by 
hypothesis, to account for an episode of apparently wishful imagining (or pacifying representation more generally). Such 
wishes stand to the process of wishful imagining manifest in a dream, day-dream, etc., partly as desires stand to the actions 
they are cited to explain. Hence just as a desire can be read in part from the intentional action which the desire is 
hypothesised to explain, so the wish can be read in part from the episode of imagining -- from the dream or day-dream --
which it is hypothesised to explain; and just as the action serves to pacify the desire, so, apparently, the imagining serves to 
pacify this wish.
This indicates that the wishes introduced in the psychoanalytic explanation of dreams in accord with W are comparable, from 
a methodological perspective, to the desires introduced in the explanation of action in accord with D*. In particular, we can 
see that psychoanalytic hypotheses admit of testing, and hence of confirmation, in the same sort of way as those advanced 
in the commonsense explanation of action, which in general we regard as capable of a high degree of cogency. In this case, 
however, the hypotheses concern motives (dream wishes) of a kind which are capable of explaining phenomena which are 
unexplained in commonsense psychology, and whose contents are different and more extreme.
We can mark this difference by noting that the wishes which Freud has here uncovered -- even in this most superficial layer 
of interpretation -- already stand in striking contrast to motives standardly acknowledged in waking life. By everyday 
standards, for example, these wishes are highly egoistic, ruthless, and extreme. We should regard someone who acted on 
desires with these contents -- who to escape an imagined reproach arranged for a friend and patient to be seriously ill, and 
for revenge threw the blame for this on another friend, the author of the supposed reproach -- as criminal or worse. Likewise 
the way of thinking shown in the dream is radically defective: the reversal of Otto's reproach, for example, seems like a 
transparently childish 'It's not me that's bad -- it's you.' (Projection) Also, the dream-wishes are sharply at variance with 
Freud's other motives, so that the representation of their fulfilment seems alarming rather than pleasant, and the 
acknowledgement of them, even as mere dream-wishes, is not entirely easy. Thus take the wish that Irma be physically ill. 
Since she was Freud's friend and patient, this would have been a source of considerable distress in real life; and the situation 
was one of some alarm in the dream. Accordingly in acknowledging the wish Freud says that he 'had a sense of 
awkwardness at having invented such a severe illness for Irma simply in order to clear myself. It looked so cruel...' So even in 
this first example, we begin to find a significant extension of commonsense psychology.
And clearly, even in this first example, the extension goes further. We have been considering Freud's dream in relation to 
events of the day before, and his apparent wishes (i) not to be responsible for Irma's suffering and (ii) to turn the tables on his 
imagined accuser Otto. But it is clear from Freud's associations that the dream also related to deeper matters of responsibility, 
and in particular to Freud's role in the death of one of his patients, and one of his friends. Thus he associated as follows to 
the element of the dream in which he called in Dr. M to examine Irma.
I at once called in Dr. M., and he repeated the examination....This reminded me of 
a tragic event in my practice. I had on one occasion produced a severe toxic state 
in a woman patient by repeatedly prescribing what was at that time regarded as a 
harmless remedy (sulphanol), and had hurriedly turned for assistance and 
support to my experienced senior colleague...My patient -- who succumbed to the 
poison -- had the same name as my eldest daughter...Mathilde...(IV 111,112)
This touches also on the theme of thoughtless medication, which was also connected with the death of one of Freud's friends, 
as well as some lesser matters, which, however, also seem likely causes of guilt. As Freud introduces this topic:
What I saw in her throat: a white patch and turbinal bones with scabs on them....I 
was making frequent use of cocaine at that time to relieve some troublesome 
nasal swellings, and I had heard a few days earlier that one of my women 
patients who had followed my example had developed an extensive necrosis 
[area of dead tissue] of the nasal mucous membrane. I had been the first to 
recommend the [medical] use of cocaine, in 1885, and this recommendation had 
brought serious reproaches down on me. The misuse of that drug had hastened 
the death of a dear friend of mine...I had advised him to use the drug internally 
[i.e. orally] only, while morphia was being withdrawn; but he had at once given 
himself cocaine injections. (IV 111, 115)
So the figure of Irma in the dream was linked in Freud's mind with that of three persons to whom he had done some damage 
in his medical interventions, including two who had actually died as a result of them. These cases are apparently alluded to in 
the dream in a number of ways, for example in M's statement above that 'the toxin will be eliminated.' Their role becomes 
clearer if we consider Freud's associations to the final elements of the dream, which were quoted above.
Injections of that sort ought not to be made so thoughtlessly. Here an accusation 
of thoughtlessness was being made directly against my friend Otto. I seemed to 
remember thinking something of the same kind that afternoon when his words 
and looks had appeared to show that he was siding against me. It had been some 
such notion as: 'How easily his thoughts are influenced! How thoughtlessly he 
jumps to conclusions!' -- Apart from this, this sentence in the dream reminded me 
once more of my dead friend who had so hastily resorted to cocaine injections....I 
noticed too that in accusing Otto of thoughtlessness in handling chemical 
substances I was once more touching upon the story of the unfortunate Mathilde, 
which gave grounds for the same accusation against myself...
And probably the syringe had not been clean : This was yet another accusation 
against Otto, but derived from a different source. I had happened the day before 
to meet the son of an old lady of eighty-two, to whom I had to give an injection of 
morphia twice a day. At the moment she was in the country and he told me that 
she was suffering from phlebitis. I had at once thought it must be an infiltration 
caused by a dirty syringe. I was proud of the fact that in two years I had not 
caused a single infiltration; I took constant pains to be sure that the syringe was 
clean. In short: I was conscientious. (IV 117,118)
Thus on examination, Freud's associations indicate further apparently non-coincidental connections with his dream, which we 
can represent as follows:
From the Associations From the Dream
Freud accidentally caused the death 
of a patient by prescribing her a toxic 
substance.
Otto misuses toxic substances.
Freud advised a friend to take 
cocaine, and the friend's death was 
hastened by cocaine injections.
Freud reproaches Otto with the 
thought that injections of that kind 
ought not be made so thoughtlessly.
It seems clear that, just as Freud wished to avoid culpable responsibility for Irma's suffering, so he might well have wished 
that he could avoid such responsibility in these cases as well. So applying Freud's form of hypothesis to this data, we have:
From the Associations Hypothesis about wishful 
imagining which connects 
associations and dream.
From the Dream
Freud accidentally caused 
the death of a patient by 
giving her a toxic substance.
Freud wishfully represents 
Otto rather than himself as 
responsible for the misuse of 
toxic substances, as in the 
case of the patient whose 
death he caused.
Otto misuses toxic 
substances.
Freud advised a friend to 
take cocaine, and the friend's 
death was hastened by 
cocaine injections.
Freud wishfully represents 
Otto rather than himself as 
responsible for thoughtless 
injections, as were given in 
the case of his friend who 
died.
Freud reproaches Otto with 
the thought that injections of 
that kind ought not be made 
so thoughtlessly.
These hypotheses are deeper than those than those which touch merely on the day before the dream and the figure of Irma 
herself. They involve further figures, the more distant past, and deeper emotions. What Freud took to be in question in Otto's 
remark was responsibility for Irma's continued neurotic suffering. What was in question in the case of his friend and patient, 
however, was responsibility of a graver kind: that for causing death. Hence the deeper emotion involved is guilt. This is 
coherent with the wish not to be responsible for Irma's suffering shown more explicitly in the dream; for although Freud does 
not make the point explicit, this too would be a source of guilt.
To accept these further hypotheses, therefore, is to see the dream as wishfully related not only to persons and events of the 
day before the dream, but also to persons and events from the past. To put the point in terms of some of Freud's theoretical 
terminology: in these hypotheses the image of Irma in the dream is seen as a condensation, involving not only Irma herself, 
but also the friend and patient from the past, in whose cases Freud would like to be free of guilt; and the dream effects a 
wishful displacement of the kind of guilt Freud felt in respect of these cases too on to the figure of Otto. The dream is thus 
shaped by persons and events from the past, which are linked in the mind of the dreamer with those from the day before, but
have a deeper emotional significance.
In seeing the dream in this way, moreover, we also have reason to see Freud's conscious feelings and actions in a different 
light. For we can now see, for example, that Freud was so sensitive to Otto's remark, and so ready to regard Otto as 
thoughtless, because Otto's remark touched upon issues of medical responsibility which were particularly significant for 
Freud, even though he was not aware of them at the time, and would not have become aware of them had he not analysed 
the dream. (Likewise for Freud's action of writing up Irma's case history, his contemplation of his own care with respect to 
injections, and so forth.) The point is not that these thoughts, feelings, and actions are not to be seen partly as Freud 
consciously represents them; it is rather that the dream and associations indicate that they are also to be seen in another 
way, that is, as related to the past, and to guilt, in ways the conscious representation alone tells us nothing of.
V
Although our discussion has touched on only a few of the relevant topics, it suggests that we can see Freud's reasoning in 
this paradigmatic example as an extension of the kind of patterned interpretation we find in everyday life, and one which 
admits of potentially strong confirmation in the same way. We noted above that in everyday interpretation an interpreter could 
cross-check the interpretation of a variety of verbal and non-verbal actions, and so both confirm and explore the limits of the 
interpretee's first-person authority. From our example we can see that cross-checking in psychoanalysis also plays a distinct 
but complementary role. The example shows that the interpretation of wishfulfilments in accord with W can introduce new 
desires and wishes, such as Freud's desire to be free from blame for thoughtless injections, whose ascription can be cross-
checked against both the explanation of actions in accord with D*, and the explanation of further wishfulfilments via W.
Interpretation in accord with W thus has the capacity both to discover new (or previously unacknowledged) motives and to 
contribute to confirmation of their role in human psychology. So Freud's discovery of this mode interpretation has the power 
to extend commonsense psychology in ways which are potentially radical, cumulative, and sound. Radical, because the 
interpretation of dreams (or other wishfulfilments) evidently leads quickly to the ascription of wishes very different from those 
acknowledged in everyday life, and also to the discernment of new mental mechanisms, new kinds of dependency of present 
mental life on the past, and so forth. Cumulative, because the kinds of wishes we can discern by this means depend upon 
the desires we take people to have in waking life, and our hypotheses about these, as we have just seen in the case of Freud, 
tend to be strikingly enriched as a result of considering dreams. So the discovery of dream-wishes might lead to further 
hypotheses about waking motives, and these to the finding of further dream wishes, and so on, in rapid succession. 
(Something of this may be visible in Freud's consideration of the Oedipus Complex in The Interpretation of Dreams.) Finally, 
even such a radical and cumulative extension might be sound, in the sense that each further hypothesis about new wishes, 
desires, etc., might be thoroughly cross-checked via the interpretation of very many dreams (or other wishfulments) and 
verbal and non-verbal actions, and hence be intuitively confirmed to a high degree.
Freud and his successors have in effect claimed that this is so. The argument here suggest that while this would be very 
difficult to demonstrate, it might nonetheless be true. If this is so there is at least some case for regarding psychoanalysis, as 
Freud intended, as an interpretive science. Still we should recognize that even a cogent interpretive discipline could never 
fully seem like a real science. For any interpretive discipline must be one in which the tacit and intuitive testing of hypotheses 
outruns our capacities to make the relevant data, claims, and inferences fully explicit and communicable. Whether we choose 
to call psychoanalysis a science or not, it seems to be such a case; and hence however well psychoanalytic hypotheses are 
confirmed, we must expect them to remain in dispute.(2)
_____________________________________________________________
Appendix: Cross-checking the interpretation of language and action.
To represent the points discussed in the text more schematically, let us imagine that we have an interpreter A and an 
interpretee B, and that the sentences of their idiolects are numbered, so that A's sentences include P1, P2...Pn... and B's 
include *1, *2, ...*n.... Then in trying to understand B's language A will be trying to devise a correlation in his own idiolect 
whose instances might be represented as:
'*1' is true (in B's idiolect) just if P1
'*2' is true (in B's idiolect) just if P2
'*3' is true (in B's idiolet) just if P3
'*4' is true (in B's idiolect) just if P4
and so on. We may call this the */P correlation, and it could be effected by a theory of truth for B's language.
Let us suppose that A has a hypothetical understanding of B's utterances which includes these interpretations, and also that 
A is able to interpret some non-verbal action of B's, by a tree such as the following.
Since A also has a tenative understanding of B's idiolect, he can use this to translate this tree into B's sentences, that is, as
Now suppose also that A can get B to explain what he is doing, or otherwise to express the desires and beliefs upon which B 
is acting, so that B's own use of sentences gives us a further tree. This gives us two trees in B's idiolect, the first supplied via 
A's interpretation of B's language and action, the second via B's own exercise of first-person authority. Given these materials, 
can now test his understanding of B's language and action by comparing these trees. If (i) A has understood B's action 
correctly, and (ii) A's translation of A's hypthetical tree into B's idiolect is correct, and (iii) B has first-person authority, then the 
translated tree, and that produced by B, should match sentence for sentence.
This is a very precise and antecedently improbable prediction; so if it is correct A can regard his understanding of B's 
sentences and action, and A's possession of first-person authority, as simultaneously confirmed. (Alternatively, if the trees fail 
to match at any point, A has reason to hold that his interpretation of B's speech or action was mistaken, or that B's first-
person authority is defective at this point.) More fully, a match between the trees should raise A's confidence in his initial tree, 
towards whatever level he associates with B's first-person authority in the case, while also confirming B's possession of this 
authority, by showing a correlation between self-ascription and the results of interpretation by another. Finally, the match 
offers support for A's understanding of B's idiolect, with regard to all the sentences which figured in the trees, for it indicates 
A maps B's sentences on to the same actions and situations as B himself. Repeated support of this kind would thus 
constitute confirmation of A's hypothesis as to the */P correlation generally.
It thus appears that insofar as we hold that this kind of match with the speech of an interpretee obtains for an interpreter's 
trees for actions generally, we thereby hold (i) that the interpretee has a degree of well-founded first-person authority about 
her goals and beliefs; (ii) that the interpreter can enjoy a degree of confidence in ascribing these goals and beliefs which 
tends to approach that of the interpretee; and (iii) that the interpretation of any action can be turned to the testing, and hence 
to the confirmation, of the interpreter's understanding of the interpretee's sentences. So systematic triangulation between 
utterance and action of the kind we have been considering can tend simultaneously to render interpretation cogent, first-
person authority credible, and our interpretive grip on the meanings of sentences as firm as any we possess.
